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Barbara Baumeister and Jan-Hendrik de Wiljes
Abstract
In this paper we propose a method to construct logarithmic signatures
which are not amalgamated transversal and further do not even have a
periodic block. The latter property was crucial for the successful attack on
the system MST 3 by Blackburn et al. [1]. The idea for our construction
is based on the theory in Szabó’s book about group factorizations [12].
1 Introduction
In the 80’s Magliveras, Stinson and van Trung introduced two public key cryp-
tosystems, MST 1 and MST 2, based on factorizations, covers and logarithmic
signatures, of finite nonabelian groups [9]. Recently, Lempken, Magliveras, van
Trung and Wei [6] developed a third cryptosystem, MST 3.
A main question is how to produce covers and logarithmic signatures for a
group. Blackburn et al. [1] suggested a construction of so called amalgamated
transversal logarithmic signatures from exact transversal logarithmic signatures
(for the definition see Section 4.1). Based on the use of these amalgamated
transversal logarithmic signatures they presented a successful attack on the
system MST 3.
In this paper we propose a method to construct logarithmic signatures which
are not amalgamated transversal and further do not even have the property of
being periodic, which was crucial for breaking the system MST 3 (see cases 2
and 3 in subsection 4.3 in [1]). The idea for this construction is based on the
theory in Szabó’s book about group factorizations [12].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 covers and logarithmic sig-
natures will be introduced and some basic facts will be presented. We shortly
introduce the cryptosystem MST 3, for further information see also [6] or [1].
Then we introduce the in [6] proposed platform groups, the Suzuki 2-groups.
The question of how to construct logarithmic signatures will be the main issue of
Section 4. In Section 5 we present the method for the construction of aperiodic
logarithmic signatures. We will close with some final thoughts and remarks on
further research in Section 6.
2 Covers and logarithmic signatures
The cryptosystem MST 3 is based on the use of covers and logarithmic sig-
natures. We will introduce them in this section and give a short overview of
necessary results. Further information can be found in [2], [6], [7], [8] and [9].
Throughout this paper, G denotes a finite group and every set is assumed to be
finite.
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LetK ⊆ G and α = [A1, . . . , As] be a sequence of sequencesAi = [ai,1, . . . , ai,ri ]
with ai,j ∈ G, such that
s∑
i=1
|Ai| is bounded by a polynomial in dlog |K|e. Then
α is a cover for K ⊆ G, if every product a1,j1 · · · as,js lies in K and if every
g ∈ K can be written as
g = a1,j1 · · · as,js (1)
with ji ∈ {1, . . . , |Ai|}. We denote the set of all covers for K ⊆ G by C(K|G).
If, moreover, the tuple (j1, . . . , js) is unique for every k ∈ K then α is called
a logarithmic signature for K. The set of all logarithmic signatures for K is
denoted by Λ(K|G).
We call the product a1,j1 · · · as,js in (1) a factorization of g w.r.t. α. Two
factorizations a1,j1 · · · as,js and a1,h1 · · · as,hs of g are different if (j1, . . . , js) 6=
(h1, . . . , hs). (Note that for α = [[a, a], [b, b]] the element ab has four different
factorizations a · b.)
If α = [A1, . . . , As] ∈ C(K|G) with ri := |Ai| for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, then the
sequence Ai is called a block of α and the sequence (r1, . . . , rs) the type of α.
The length of α is
l(α) :=
s∑
i=1
ri.
Covers of minimal length are noteworthy due to the fact that less memory
capacity has to be used. The interested reader is referred to [7] for information
on this issue.
For the application in cryptography the following distinction is made. A
logarithmic signature β ∈ Λ(K|G) is tame if every g ∈ K can be factorized
polynomial in dlog|K|e w.r.t. to β, otherwise β is called wild.
The following map α˘ is used during the encryption and decryption procedure
of the cryptosystem MST 3. Later on we will identify factorizing w. r. t. a cover
α with inverting α˘.
Let α = [A1, . . . , As] ∈ C(K|G) be a cover for K ⊆ G of type (r1, . . . , rs)
with Ai = [ai,1, . . . , ai,ri ] and let
m :=
s∏
i=1
ri, m1 := 1 and mi :=
i−1∏
l=1
rl for all i ∈ {2, . . . , s}.
Let τα be the canonic bijection from Zr1 × · · · × Zrs to Zm, i. e.
τα : Zr1 × · · · × Zrs → Zm, τα(j1, . . . , js) :=
s∑
i=1
jimi.
That is a generalization of n-ary representations. Let α˘ : Zm → K be the
surjection:
α˘(x) := a1,j1+1 · · · as,js+1, where (j1, . . . , js) = τ−1α (x).
Note that τ−1α can be computed efficiently (using Euclid’s algorithm) and
therefore the same is true for α˘. Moreover, the map τα does only depend on the
type of α, i. e. for α, β ∈ C(K|G) we have
τα = τβ ⇔ α and β are of the same type.
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Let g ∈ G and let αg be the number of pairwise different factorizations
a1,j1 · · · as,js of g w.r.t. α. Then g has exactly αg different preimages w. r. t. α˘◦
τα, namely the tuples (j1, . . . , js) with g = a1,j1 · · · as,js . That is the connection
to equation (1). Therefore, a logarithmic signature β ∈ Λ(K|G) is tame if we
can compute β˘−1 polynomial in dlog|K|e.
For F ∈ {C,Λ, . . . } we use the notation
F(G) := F(G|G).
3 The cryptosystem MST3
Alice chooses a public non-abelian group G with large center Z and generates
• a tame logarithmic signature β = [B1, . . . , Bs] ∈ Λ(Z) of type (r1, . . . , rs)
• and a random cover α = [A1, . . . , As] ∈ C(K|G) for a subset K of G with
ai,ji ∈ G\Z for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and ji ∈ {1, . . . , ri}, which is of the same
type as β.
Then she chooses random elements t0, . . . , ts ∈ G\Z and computes the following
covers:
• α˜ = [A˜1, . . . , A˜s], whereat A˜i = t−1i−1Aiti for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s},
• γ := [H1, . . . ,Hs] with Hi := [bi,1a˜i,1, . . . , bi,ri a˜i,ri ] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}.
The public key is (α, γ) and the private key is (β, t0, . . . , ts).
To encrypt an element x ∈ Z|Z|, Bob computes y1 = α˘(x) and y2 = γ˘(x)
and sends y = (y1, y2) to Alice.
Alice decrypts y by calculating β˘−1(y2t−1s y
−1
1 t0) which equals x. As β is
tame, the decryption-algorithm is efficient.
The cryptographic hypothesis is the problem of factorizing w. r. t. the ran-
dom cover α. Furthermore it has to be hard for the attacker to reconstruct the
private key by using the public key. For information on these two issues we refer
the reader to [1], [3] and [10].
Remark 3.1 Lempken, Magliveras, van Trung and Wei [6] demand two addi-
tional properties.
Firstly the group G should not be a direct product of Z and a subgroup
U ≤ G, otherwise the system could be weakened using Schreier-trees [6].
The second assumption is ai,ja−1i,l /∈ Z for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and j 6= l.
However, Blackburn et al. [1] didn’t use that property for their attacks, because
it holds for a large number of public keys and it is not required during the
encryption and decryption process.
Lempken et al. [6] suggested the use of Suzuki 2-groups (see also [4] and [5])
as platform-groups for the system:
Let θ 6= id be an odd order field automorphism of Fq (q = 2n). We then
define the Suzuki 2-group as
G := {S(c, d) : c, d ∈ Fq} ,
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where
S(c, d) :=
1 0 0c 1 0
d cθ 1
 .
Lemma 3.2 The center Z(G) = {S(0, d) : d ∈ Fq} is an elementary abelian
2-group.
We will now concentrate on the construction of β and we will restrict us, mo-
tivated by the Lemma 3.2, to elementary abelian 2-groups, although all results
in Section 5 hold for every abelian group.
4 Classes of logarithmic signatures
4.1 Exact transversal logarithmic signatures
A logarithmic signature β = [B1, . . . , Bs] for a group G is called l-exact transver-
sal (r-exact transversal) if there is a subgroup chain
G = G0 > G1 > · · · > Gs = {1},
such that Bi is a left (right) transversal of Gi in Gi−1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s}. A
logarithmic signature is said to be exact transversal if it is l-exact transversal
or r-exact transversal. We denote the set of all exact transversal logarithmic
signatures for a group G by ET (G).
Remark 4.1 The block Bs of an exact transversal logarithmic signature β is
a subgroup of G, more precisely Bs = Gs−1. Moreover, [Bi, . . . , Bs] is an exact
transversal logarithmic signature for Gi−1.
4.2 Amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures
Let β = [B1, . . . , Bs] be an exact transversal logarithmic signature of type
(r1, . . . , rs) for an abelian group G. Blackburn et al. [1] define the following
operations on β:
• permute elements within each Bi,
• permute the Bi,
• replace Bi by a translate Big for some g ∈ G,
• amalgamate two sets Bi and Bj by the single set Bi · Bj := {gh | g ∈
Bi, h ∈ Bj}.
The logarithmic signatures that are constructed from an exact transversal log-
arithmic signature by applying a finite number of the four previous maps are
called amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures, see [1]. We will denote
the set of amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures for a group G by
AT (G).
The amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures have the special prop-
erty of being periodic, which Blackburn et al. [1] used to break MST 3 under
the assumption that the platform-group G is a Suzuki-2-group. A subset B of
an abelian group G is called periodic if there exists a g ∈ G\{1} (the period)
with gB = B. Let P (B) := {g ∈ G\{1} : gB = B} be the set of periods of B.
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Proposition 4.2 (Blackburn et al. [1], Lemma 2.1) Let G be an abelian group
and β ∈ AT (G). Then at least one of the blocks Bi of β is periodic.
Blackburn et al showed that every amalgamated transversal logarithmic sig-
nature can be used in MST 3. Their proof is based on Proposition 4.2, see
[1].
Theorem 4.3 (Blackburn et al. [1], Lemma 2.2) Let G be an elementary abelian
2-group. Every logarithmic signature β ∈ AT (G) is tame.
5 Constructing aperiodic tame logarithmic sig-
natures
Since the usage of amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures leaves the
cryptosystem insecure, we are in need to find new ways of constructing tame
logarithmic signatures, preferably some without periodic blocks. In this section
we introduce an algorithm to construct tame logarithmic signatures without
periodic blocks.
As in a logarithmic signature β every group element is at most once in a
block and as the position of the element inside a block is irrelevant for the
tameness of β, see Theorem 4.4, we will consider sets instead of sequences.
We call a logarithmic signature β ∈ Λ(G) aperiodic if non of the blocks Bi
is periodic. The set of all aperiodic logarithmic signatures for a group G is
denoted by A(G).
Theorem 5.1 (Szabó [12], Theorem 7.3.1) Let G be an elementary abelian 2-
group. There exists an aperiodic logarithmic signature β of type (r1, . . . , rs) with
r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rs ≥ 2 if
• s = 2 and r2 ≥ 8 or
• s ≥ 3 and r1 ≥ 8, rs ≥ 4 holds.
There does not exist an aperiodic logarithmic signature of type (r1, . . . , rs) with
r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rs ≥ 2 if one of the following cases holds:
• rs = 2,
• s = 1,
• s = 2 and r2|4,
• s ≥ 3 and r1|4, . . . , rs|4.
We are going to use the idea of the proof of this theorem to construct tame
aperiodic logarithmic signatures for elementary abelian 2-groups, for example
for the center of a Suzuki 2-Group.
5.1 The algorithm
Now we are presenting the algorithm which constructs a new logarithmic signa-
ture out of a subgroup and a left transversal of that subgroup. The realization
of some rather vague steps in the algorithm, namely the construction of δ and
all α(j1,...,js), will be discussed in the last part of the paper.
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Algorithm 5.2 We start with an abelian group G, choose a subgroup U of G
and a transversal R of U in G. Then we generate
δ = (D1, . . . , Ds) ∈ Λ(R)
with
Di = {di,1, . . . , di,ri}
of type (r1, . . . , rs) and logarithmic signatures
α(j1,...,js) :=
(
A
(j1)
1 , . . . , A
(js)
s
)
∈ Λ(U)
for all (j1, . . . , js) ∈ {1, . . . , r1}× · · · × {1, . . . , rs}. We get β := (B1, . . . , Bs) by
B1 := d1,1A
(1)
1 ∪ · · · ∪ d1,r1A(r1)1 , · · · ,
Bs := ds,1A
(1)
s ∪ · · · ∪ ds,rsA(rs)s .
Notice that we needed all the logarithmic signatures α(j1,...,js) to be able to
produce an aperiodic logarithmic signature.
Example 5.3 We choose G = 〈u, v, w, x, y, z〉 = 26, U = 〈u, v, w, x〉, R =
{1, y, z, yz} and set
D1 := {1, z}, D2 := {1, y}.
and
A
(1)
1 := {1, u, v, uv}, A(2)1 := {1, w, x, wx},
A
(1)
2 := {1, uw, vx, uvwx}, A(2)2 := {1, ux, uvw, vwx}.
We get
B1 := {1, u, v, uv, z, wz, xz, wxz}, B2 := {1, uw, vx, uvwx, y, uxy, uvwy, vwxy}.
Neither of these two blocks is periodic. It follows that β ∈ A(G) of type (8, 8).
Theorem 5.4 The sequence β constructed by the algorithm 5.2 is a logarithmic
signature for G of type (l1, . . . , ls), where li =
∑ri
j=1 |A(j)i |.
We denote a logarithmic signature which can be obtained from U and R by
the construction above decomposed and reunited out of U and R, shortly d.r.,
and we denote the set of logarithmic signatures for a group G which are d.r. by
DRG(U,R, E(U |G),F(R|G)) where E ,F ∈ {Λ, ET ,AT , . . . }.
Remark 5.5 Every logarithmic signature β = (B1, . . . , Bs) ∈ Λ(G) is d.r. out
of U = G and R = {1}: Set δ = (1, . . . , 1) and A(1)i = Bi for all i = 1, . . . , s.
An immediate question is how the choice of U and R influences the set
DRG(U,R, E(U |G),F(R|G)). Another question is which logarithmic signatures
are constructible out of the pair (U,R) when we choose γ and α(j1,...,js) to be
for example exact transversal only.
It is possible to construct an aperiodic logarithmic signature by using only
total exact transversals, i.e. exact transversals where every block is a subgroup,
see Example 5.3 above.
Proposition 5.6 A logarithmic signature which is d.r. is tame if δ and all
α(j1,...,js) are tame and if for every g ∈ G the coset representative in R which
lies in the same coset as g can be found efficiently.
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5.2 Aperiodicity of β
From now on we assume that β = (B1, . . . , Bs) is constructed by the algo-
rithm 5.2 and we use the notation introduced there. Next we summarize some
basic facts. After that we show how to choose the sets A(j)i to force the non-
periodicity of Bi.
Lemma 5.7 We have d−1i,j di,k /∈ U for all i = 1, . . . , s and j, k = 1, . . . , ri with
j 6= k.
Proof. We assume that there are i and j 6= k with d−1i,j di,k ∈ U . We consider
the two factorizations
d1,1 · · · di−1,1di,jdi+1,1 · · · ds,1 and d1,1 · · · di−1,1di,kdi+1,1 · · · ds,1.
These elements of R are in different cosets of U in G. On the other hand we
have
(d1,1 · · · di−1,1di,jdi+1,1 · · · ds,1)−1d1,1 · · · di−1,1di,kdi+1,1 · · · ds,1 = d−1i,j di,k ∈ U,
which is not possible.
Lemma 5.8 Let A,B ≤ G. Then A = B if and only if there exists an element
g ∈ G with gA = B.
Lemma 5.9 If Bi is periodic with period g ∈ G, then for every di,jA(j)i there
is a k ∈ {1, . . . , ri}, such that
gdi,jA
(j)
i = di,kA
(k)
i .
If additionally A(j)i , A
(k)
i ≤ G holds, then A(j)i = A(k)i .
Proof. Assume there is no such k. Then we have a1, a2 ∈ A(j)i with a1 6= a2 and
b ∈ A(e)i , c ∈ A(l)i for e 6= l, such that gdi,ja1 = di,eb and gdi,ja2 = di,lc. From
that it follows d−1i,l di,e = ca
−1
2 a1b
−1 ∈ U, which is a contradiction to Lemma 5.7.
This shows the first statement. The second part follows from Lemma 5.8.
To describe the periodic signatures β we introduce for i ∈ {1, . . . , s} the set
D
(j)
i :=
{
di,k : A
(k)
i = A
(j)
i
}
of elements di,k that have the same corresponding subset A
(k)
i . Then we imme-
diately obtain the following:
Lemma 5.10 Bi is periodic if one of the following holds:
(i)
ri⋂
j=1
P
(
A
(j)
i
)
6= ∅.
(ii)
ri⋂
j=1
P
(
D
(j)
i
)
6= ∅.
The special case ri = 2 or 3 and pairwise different subgroups A
(j)
i of the
following theorem was proven in cooperation with Anja Nuss [11].
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Theorem 5.11 Let A(j)i ≤ G for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ri}. Then Bi is periodic if and
only if
ri⋂
j=1
P
(
X(j)
)
6= ∅
holds for at least one ri-tuple
(
X(1), . . . , X(ri)
) ∈ {A(1)i , D(1)i }×· · ·×{A(ri)i , D(ri)i }.
Proof. One part of the equivalence follows from Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10.
Now assume that Bi is periodic. Let g ∈ G be a period of Bi. By Lemma
5.9 we have for every j and D(j)i = {di,j1 , . . . , di,jk} that
g
(
di,j1A
(j)
i ∪ · · · ∪ di,jkA(j)i
)
= di,j1A
(j)
i ∪ · · · ∪ di,jkA(j)i .
Moreover, every di,jlA
(j)
i is mapped to a di,jcA
(j)
i by multiplication with g.
Therefore g must be either an element of A(j)i , i. e. g ∈ P
(
A
(j)
i
)
or g permutes
the elements of D(j)i , i. e. g ∈ P
(
D
(j)
i
)
.
An immediate consequence is the following equivalence.
Corollary 5.12 Let A(j)i ≤ G for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ri} and A(j)i 6= A(k)i for all
j, k ∈ {1, . . . , ri} with j 6= k. Then Bi is periodic if and only if
ri⋂
j=1
P
(
A
(j)
i
)
6= ∅.
If at least one A(j)i is not a subgroup of G, then the statement of Theorem
5.11 does not hold anymore. The following example shows that we can already
get a periodic block when ri = 2.
Example 5.13 We choose G := 〈u, v, w, x, y, z〉 = 26, U = 〈u, v, w, x〉 and set
A
(1)
1 := {1, u, v, uvw}, A(2)1 := {u, 1, uv, vw} = u−1A(1)1
and
D1 := {1, y}.
Then we get
B1 = d1,1A
(1)
1 ∪ d1,2A(2)1 = {1, u, v, uvw, uy, y, uvy, vwy},
which has the period uy. But the other conditions of Theorem 5.11 are fulfilled
because of
P
(
D
(1)
1
)
= P
(
D
(2)
1
)
= P
(
A
(1)
1
)
= P
(
A
(2)
1
)
= ∅.
If we set
A
(1)
2 := A
(2)
2 := {1, w, x, wx} and D2 := {1, z},
then we get a logarithmic signature for G.
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Next we generalize Theorem 5.11. For G a group and A,B ⊆ G we say that
A is a multiple of B if there is a g ∈ G with gA = B. Notice if B is a subgroup
of G and A a multiple of B, then A is a left coset of B in G. We say that a
multiple A of B is proper, if A 6= B.
Lemma 5.14 If Bi is periodic with period g ∈ G, if A(j)i is not a proper multiple
of A(k)i and if gdi,jA
(j)
i = di,kA
(k)
i , then A
(j)
i = A
(k)
i .
Proof. That follows immediately from the previous definition, because of d−1i,kgdi,jA
(j)
i =
A
(k)
i .
Theorem 5.15 Suppose that A(j)i is not a proper multiple of A
(k)
i for all j, k ∈
{1, . . . , ri}. Then Bi is periodic if and only if
ri⋂
j=1
P
(
X(j)
)
6= ∅
for at least one ri-tuple
(
X(1), . . . , X(ri)
) ∈ {A(1)i , D(1)i }× · · · ×{A(ri)i , D(ri)i }.
Proof. The proof is analog to the one of Theorem 5.11 but we have to use
Lemma 5.14 instead of Lemma 5.9.
Corollary 5.16 Suppose that A(j)i is not a multiple of A
(k)
i for all j, k ∈
{1, . . . , ri}. Then Bi is periodic if and only if
ri⋂
j=1
P
(
A
(j)
i
)
6= ∅.
5.3 Concret construction for G elementary abelian of or-
der 2n.
We will construct aperiodic logarithmic signatures for elementary abelian 2-
groups G. Such a logarithmic signature has already been constructed in Exam-
ple 5.3 for G = 26. Now we generate one for G = 27 and then use these two
logarithmic signatures to construct tame aperiodic logarithmic signatures for all
groups 2n with n ≥ 6.
Example 5.17 (see also Szabó [12], Theorem 7.3.1) We chooseG = 〈t, u, v, w, x, y, z〉 =
27, U = 〈u, v, w, x, y, z〉, R = {1, t} and set
A
(1)
1 := {1, v, wx, vwx}, A(2)1 := {1, w, vz, vwz},
A
(1)
2 := {1, x, y, xyz},
A
(1)
3 := {1, z, u, zuw}.
and
D1 := {1, t}, D2 := {1}, D3 := {1}.
The resulting logarithmic signature β is aperiodic of type (8, 4, 4).
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General construction. Let G = 2n be an elementary abelian group of order
n and let B = {g1, . . . , gn} be a generating set for G. We now decompose G in
the following way:
G = U1 × · · · × Us︸ ︷︷ ︸
=U
×D1 × · · · ×Ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
=R
where U1 ×D1 is a small group with a known aperiodic logarithmic signature
β′ (see Examples 5.13 and 5.17) and 2 ≤ |Di| <
∏i−1
j=1 |Uj | for i ∈ {2, . . . , s}.
Then we choose for every i ∈ {2, . . . , s} a subset Ki := {k(1)i , . . . , k(ri)i } ⊆
(U1 × · · · × Ui−1)# of size ri := |Di|. We construct the logarithmic signature
β = [β′, B2, . . . , Bs] using Algorithm 5.2 by setting
δ := [D2, . . . , Ds],
A
(j)
i := {1} ∪ {k(j)i u : u ∈ U#i }, for i = 2, . . . , s and j = 1, . . . , ri.
Then no A(j)i is the multiple of an A
(l)
i for some l 6= j. Therefore, Corollary
5.16 implies that the resulting logarithmic signature β for G is aperiodic.
For security and storage issues it seems to be reasonable to choose small
subgroups Ui and Di. Further, one should apply some of the operations from
subsection 4.2 to β to hide the subgroup U1 ×D1, more precisely, the blocks of
the logarithmic signature β′, otherwise an attacker could obtain a periodic (and
therefore tame) logarithmic signature for G/(U1 ×D1).
If we want to store this logarithmic signature we are only in need to store a
minimal generating set B = ∪2sl=1Bl of G such that the subsets Bl generate Ui
and Di, respectively, and the information which elements of B generate which
subgroups Ui andDi. The latter can be provided for example by a tuple v ∈ Z2s,
and a strict total order on the F2-vector space Fn2 , e.g. the lexicographical order,
because the position of the elements is needed for the factorization.
Factorization. We define Vi :=
∑i
k=1 vk and use the following algorithm:
Let y = KB(g) be the coordinate vector of g w.r.t. B
Let j ∈ Zs−1 be the tuple consisting only of ones
for i = s+ 1 to 2s− 1 do
for l = 1 + Vi to Vi+1 do
if yl = 0 then
ji−s = ji−s + 2vi−(l−Vi)
Let h ∈ Zs−1 be the tuple consisting only of ones
for i = 1 to s− 1 do
hi = hi + (ji − 1)2vi+1
for l = 1 + Vi to Vi+1 do
if yl = 0 then
hi = hi + 2
vi−(l−Vi)
Now we need to factorize the projection y′ of y onto U1 × R1 which yields
x = τ−1β′ (g
′) where y′ = KB′(g′) and B′ ⊆ B a generating set of U1 ×R1.
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Altogether we get τ−1β (g) = (x, h1, . . . , hs−1) and from that we receive
β˘−1(g).
Note that we have to treat β′ differently, but since U1 ×D1 is small, we get
the requested element in the factorization efficiently (meaning in O(log2|G|)) by
an exhaustive search.
Complexity. Under the assumption, that comparison and arithmetic in Z can
be done in O(1), we can compute the complexity of the factorization-algorithm
in the following way (worst case):
2s−1∑
i=s+1
Vi+1∑
l=1+Vi
(vi − l + Vi + 4) +
s−1∑
i=1
vi+1 + 3 + Vi+1∑
l=1+Vi
(vi − l + Vi + 4)

=
2s−1∑
i=1
Vi+1∑
l=1+Vi
(vi − l + Vi + 4)−
Vs+1∑
l=1+Vs
(vs − l + Vs + 4) +
s−1∑
i=1
(vi+1 + 3)
=
2s−1∑
i=1
vi+1(vi + Vi + 4)− Vi+1∑
l=1+Vi
l
−
vs+1(vs + Vs + 4)− Vs+1∑
l=1+Vs
l
+X
=
2s−1∑
i=1
(
vi+1(vi + Vi + 4)−
(
vi+1Vi +
vi+1∑
l=1
l
))
− Y +X
=
2s−1∑
i=1
(
vi+1
(
vi − 1
2
vi+1
))
+
2s−1∑
i=1
(
7
2
vi+1
)
− Y +X
≤M · n+ 7
2
n− Y +X
(
where M = max
i
∣∣∣∣vi − 12vi+1
∣∣∣∣)
with X :=
s−1∑
i=1
(vi+1 + 3), Y :=
(
vs+1(vs + Vs + 4)−
Vs+1∑
l=1+Vs
l
)
and
−Y +X = −
(
vs+1vs + 4vs+1 −
(
1
2
(vs+1)(vs+1 + 1)
))
+
s−1∑
i=1
(vi+1 + 3)
= 3s+
s−1∑
i=1
vi+1 −
(
vs +
7
2
− 1
2
vs+1
)
vs+1 − 3
≤ 4n−
(
vs +
7
2
− 1
2
vs+1
)
vs+1
Since every vi is supposed to be small, especially vs+1, M will also be small
and vs + 72 − 12vs+1 will be nonnegative, independent of n. So in that case the
runtime of the factorization-algorithm is O(n) = O(log2|G|) and, therefore, β is
tame.
6 Conclusion
We presented a new way to construct tame logarithmic signatures. The advan-
tage of this method is the possibility to produce aperiodic logarithmic signatures
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which resist the attack proposed in [1]. Although, one is in need to store δ and
all α(j1,...,js) to factorize with respect to β, this is also an aspect of security,
because an attacker doesn’t know those elements used during the construction
but is in need to find them for being able to factorize w.r.t. β, as far as we
know.
Further, we showed how to get a huge number of aperiodic tame logarith-
mic signatures by using the proposed algorithm. Although, those might not
be enough, the fact that we mainly used exact transversal logarithmic signa-
tures for the construction of our examples implies the assumption that many
more aperiodic logarithmic signatures might be gained when using for example
amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures.
Still, it is not clear if the proposed algorithm has any weaknesses in view
of the reconstruction of δ and the α(j1,...,js) from a given β because of the
known structure of the algorithm, although we conjecture that keeping the used
generating set B a secret makes it hard to extract any information. Further, we
don’t know if β is tame whether or not one knows δ and α(j1,...,js), which is also
an important issue for an attacker.
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